A Virtue Ethics Response to Moral Enhancement: Insights from the Debates of Persson & Savulescu and Harris
Ryosuke Matsumura
First Published: July 24, 2025
[in Japanese]
Abstract
This paper examines how our moral judgments and actions are altered by the moral enhancement proposed by Persson and Savulescu, and what problems arise from such changes. In the ordinary course of moral development, an agent compares his actions with those of a moral exemplar and, through reflective trial and error, acquires an appropriate understanding of right action, eventually attaining a sense of inner fulfillment or pleasure in performing such acts. However, if moral traits are externally improved through enhancement, this growth process can be bypassed, leading to a hollowing out of the content of moral actions. Therefore, the moral enhancement risks remaining at the level of superficial enhancement of judgment, while failing to foster a proper understanding of moral action or the inner development of the moral agent. This paper develops such a position while also examining Harris’s critique concern-ing the relationship between moral action and freedom, showing that his argument lacks persuasiveness. At the same time, it points out that Harris’s insights into the effectiveness of moral enhancement and the complexity of moral capacities may offer valuable perspectives for future discussions.
Key words
moral enhancement, Bioethics, virtue ethics, moral growth, prudence
